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CASE COMMENTS

FEDERAL PROCEDURE
DeclaratoryJudgments in Civil Suits following conviction of one
of the parties in a criminal case.
In an action for declaratory judgment the insured, holder
of a property insurance policy, sought to compel the insurer
to defend in an action for wrongful death in which the insured shot the deceased, a prowler. The insured was covered
by a comprehensive dwelling policy which excluded coverage
for death caused by intentional acts. The issue was whether
or not the killing was intentional. 1
Since the issue of intentional killing was already pending
in a tort action brought against the insured by the administratrix of the deceased, there was a question as to whether
the court could properly entertain this action for declaratory
judgment. The general rule is that a federal court will not
entertain a declaratory judgment action when the same issues
as those sought to be determined are pending in another
court of competent jurisdiction.2 However, the facts of this
case brought it outside this rule.3
In the principal case there was a conflict of interests between the insurer and the insured since there was a genuine
issue as to whether death was intentionally or unintentionally
inflicted. It would be unfair and inequitable to require the
insurer to defend the insured on the ground that death was
caused by an unintentional act in view of the fact the insurer
escapes liability if the act is intentional.
Therefore, the court should have entertained this action
and decided by a declaratory judgment whether the act was
intentional or unintentional.4 Unless this question is decided
1 Stout v. Grain Dealers Mutual Insurance Co., 307 F.2d 521, 523 (4th Cir.

1962).
Yellow Cab Transit Co. v. Overcash, 133 F.2d 228 (8th Cir. 1942); Brillhart v. Excess Insurance Co. of America, 316 U.S. 491 (1942).
3 Indemnity Insurance Company of North America v. Schriefer, 142 F.2d 851,
853 (4th Cit. 1944); Maryland Casualty Co. v. Boyle Construction Co.,
123 F.2d 558 (4th Cir. 1941).
4 Webster-Chicago Corp. v. Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co., 99 F.Supp.
503, 506 (D.C. Del. 1951); Howard v. Howard, 131 Calif. App. 308,
280 P.2d 802, 805 (1955).
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in advance it would have been to the insurer's interest when
defending the insured to prove a state of facts which would
release the insurer from liability.5 A weak defense would
also make it easier for the third party to prove his claim against
the insured. 6
The use of a declaratory judgment is proper in this case
but the final decision seems to be wrong. The court in deciding that the death was the result of an intentional act by
the insured used, as a basis for its decision, the insured's
conviction of voluntary manslaughter in the state criminal
action. 7 North Carolina law defines voluntary manslaughter
as the intentional killing of a person without malice. 8 The
court held that this conviction placed the insured outside
the scope of the insurance policy and as a result held that the
insurer was not required to defend the insured.
This criminal conviction, the basis of the court's holding,
should not have been admitted as evidence in this action. The
general rule is that a prior criminal conviction is inadmissible
as evidence in a subsequent civil action. 9 North Carolina
courts adhere to this rule. i0 An exception to the rule was
made by the North Carolina court in Taylor v. Taylor.' 1 Here
the court allowed a prior criminal conviction to be used as
evidence in a civil action because the plaintiff was seeking to
profit from criminal conduct for which he had been prosecuted
and convicted.
Virginia courts also follow this rule. In Aetna Casualty and
Surety Company v. Anderson,12 the Virginia court rejected as
5 Supra, note 1.

6 Ibid.
71d. at 525.
s State v. Baldwin, 152 N.C. 822, 68 S.E. 148 (1910).

9 4 JONES, EVIDENCE §§ 1816 and 1817 (2d ed. 1926); Cortes v. Rosetti,
235 N.Y.S.2d 403 (1962); Webb v. McDaniel, 218 Ga. 366, 127 S.E.2d
900 (1962); Walbert v. Farina, 199 Pa. Super. 361, 185 A.2d 825
(1962).
10 Durham Bank & Trust Co. v. Pollard, 256 N.C. 77, 123 S.E.2d 104, 108
(1961).
11257 N.C. 130, 125 S.E.2d 373, 376 (1962).
22200 Va. 385, 388, 105 S.E.2d 869, 872 (1958).
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evidence the insurer's plea that the insured's conviction in a
criminal action showed the insured not to be within the scope
of the insurance policy. In rejecting this plea the court said
that a judgement rendered in a criminal proceeding does not
establish in a civil proceeding the truth of the facts on which
it was rendered. The Eagle, Star and British Dominions Insurance
Company v. Heller'3 case is an exception to the Virginia rule.
In this case the insured, who had been convicted of arson in a
prior criminal action, was suing to collect on a fire insurance
policy. Here the court allowed the insured's criminal conviction to be used as evidence to show that the insured was
not within the scope of the insurance policy. In making this
exception, the court held that the exclusion rule is a shield for
the protection of the defendant in asserting his defense and is
not to be used as a sword to reap the benefits of an already
established and condemned criminal act. In this case the insured was not a defendant seeking to assert a defense but a
plaintiff seeking payment for his own criminal act.
The principal case does not come within this exception, for
here the insured was not trying to profit from his own wrong.
The prior criminal conviction should not have been admitted
because it denied the insured the right to assert his defense.
The court was in error in admitting the criminal conviction
*as evidence. The decision based on the criminal conviction is
prejudicial as to the insured under ordinary principles of
evidence.
J.G.
13 149 Va. 82, 106, 140 S.E. 315 (1927).

